The Culture of Being a Police Officer †Criminal Justice Essay

The Culture of Being a Police Officer – Criminal Justice Essay Free Online Research Papers The Culture of Being a Police Officer Criminal Justice Essay Our text explains that the police culture is often described as isolationist, elitist and authoritarians. â€Å"According to the conventional wisdom, the police culture consists of a set of values, attitudes and norms that are widely shared among officers, who find in the culture a way to cope with the strains of their working environment† (263). Growing up in a military family, the feeling is much the same. I feel as if we have a community of our own. To me the job of a soldier is of honor and strength, a job that speaks pride. Police culture is sustained through the way new members are selected, trained, and accepted into the police ranks. By being put through a rigorous selection process, an individual is subjecting themselves to a group or organization in which is the beginning of the police cultural assimilation. A considerable amount of police research over the past thirty years has chronicled the tendency for police to become isolated. Isolated from previous friends, isolated from the community, isolated from the legal system, and even isolated from their spouses and families (Drummond, 1976 and Skolnick, 1966). Police impose social isolation upon themselves as a means of protection against real and perceived dangers, loss of personal and professional autonomy, and social rejection (Skolnick, 1966). Skolnick found. The element of danger is generally credited with causing officers to be suspicious. In an attempt to be attentive to any possible violence the officer becomes generally suspicious of everyone. Likewise, many officers begin to distance themselves from previous friends as they do not seem to understand and appreciate the rigors of being a cop. Administrative factors such as shift work, days off during the week, and court time tend to isolate the officer from persons other than other police. Police also become isolated due to their authority. One impact is the potential that isolation provides for officers to engage in deviant behavior. An area that has been the subject of concern by the courts, legislatures, and citizens is that of the amount of discretion that police officers have in administering the laws. The reason for concern has been that bias on the part of individual officers can result in a wide variance as to how laws are administered. Leadership can begin to change the culture of isolation on the individual level by breaking down the culture of isolation on the organizational level. Police isolation tends to build an arrogant attitude towards dealing with criticisms and complaints (pamij.com/harrison.html). Cultural characteristics are the man-made aspects of social organization, as distinct from structural institutions, but both structure and culture influence personality and behavior. As the Anthropological Concepts of Academic Studies of Police Culture, Worldview is a mentality or cognitive orientation involving how people see themselves and see others. This is when Officer’s begin to segregate themselves from the public. They are no longer able to identify with the civilian style of life. The Officer’s begin to cling to and depend on each other for support and a style of living. The Ethos is the idea of a spirit or force in the organization that reflects an unwritten value system. This is that spirit that comes with the Officer in uniform. There is a code that can not be broken it is as if they exist within themselves. Almost as if they are their own gang and they come with many strengths and courageous acts. The Theme is the idea of a belief system that regulates or guides the kinds of relationships or social interactions that people have inside and outside of their culture. An Officer continues to live the cop life inside the uniform and outside the uniform. He always remains looking over his soldier, as if he is among enemies. The Postulates are beliefs that integrate the people in the culture (http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/205/205lect02.htm). In conclusion, there are a range of negative and positive beliefs that go with the police community and culture. A lot of those negatives have a lot to do with police segregating themselves from the rest of the world. They make themselves seem untouchable. Of course, it has to be this way being that they do fall under an elite group of people with extreme circumstances to the work they perform. Because of this untouchable appearance, it is understandable to assume that police officers must stick together and rely on one another, for they are only understood by each other. The text speaks of the fact that conflict can occur between officers who see themselves as crime fighters and those who prefer the social-service role, despite this conflict they still remain a force to be reckoned with and they will remain together. Harrison, Stephen J. Police Organizational Culture: Using Ingrained Values To Build Positive Organizational Improvement pamij.com/harrison.html Police Culture and Behavior http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/205/205lect02.htm Research Papers on The Culture of Being a Police Officer - Criminal Justice EssayUnreasonable Searches and SeizuresThe Relationship Between Delinquency and Drug UseThe Fifth Horseman19 Century Society: A Deeply Divided EraEffects of Television Violence on ChildrenQuebec and CanadaCapital PunishmentInfluences of Socio-Economic Status of Married MalesAssess the importance of Nationalism 1815-1850 EuropeComparison: Letter from Birmingham and Crito

Siege of Veracruz in the Mexican-American War

Siege of Veracruz in the Mexican-American War The Siege of Veracruz began on March 9 and ended on March 29, 1847, and was fought during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848). With the beginning of the conflict in May 1846, American forces under Major General Zachary Taylor won quick victories at the Battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma before advancing to the fortress city of Monterrey. Attacking in September 1846, Taylor captured the city after a bloody battle. In the wake of the fighting, he angered President James K. Polk when he granted the Mexicans an eight-week armistice and allowed Monterreys defeated garrison to go free.   With Taylor at Monterrey, discussions began in Washington regarding future American strategy. It was decided that a strike directly at the Mexican capital at Mexico City would be the key to winning the war. As a 500-mile march from Monterrey over rugged terrain was deemed impractical, the decision was made to land on the coast near Veracruz and march inland. This decision made, Polk was forced to decide on a commander for the mission. A New Commander While Taylor was popular, he was an outspoken Whig who had frequently criticized Polk publicly. Polk, a Democrat, would have preferred one of his own, but lacking an appropriate candidate, selected Major General Winfield Scott who, though a Whig, posed less of a political threat.  To create Scotts invasion force, the bulk of Taylors veteran troops were ordered to the coast. Left south of Monterrey with a small army, Taylor successfully held off a much larger Mexican force at the Battle of Buena Vista in February 1847. The sitting General-in-Chief of the US Army, Scott was a more talented general than Taylor and had come to prominence during the War of 1812. In that conflict, he had proven one of the few able field commanders and earned praise for his performances at Chippawa and Lundys Lane. Scott continued to rise after the war, holding increasingly important posts and studying abroad, before being appointed general-in-chief in 1841. Organizing the Army On November 14, 1846, the US Navy captured the Mexican port of Tampico. Arriving at Lobos Island, fifty miles south of the city, on February 21, 1847, Scott found few of the 20,000 men he had been promised. Over the next several days, more men arrived and Scott came to command three divisions led by Brigadier Generals William Worth and David Twiggs, and Major General Robert Patterson. While the first two divisions were comprised of US Army regulars, Pattersons was made up of volunteer units drawn from Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, Tennessee, and South Carolina. The armys infantry was supported by three regiments of dragoons under Colonel William Harney and multiple artillery units. By March 2, Scott had around 10,000 men and his transports began moving south protected by Commodore David Connors Home Squadron. Three days later, the lead ships arrived south of Veracruz and anchors off Anton Lizardo. Boarding the steamer Secretary on March 7, Connor and Scott reconnoitered the citys massive defenses. Armies Commanders: United States Major General Winfield Scott10,000 men Mexico Brigadier General Juan Morales3,360 men Americas First D-Day Considered the most heavily fortified city in the Western Hemisphere, Veracruz was walled and guarded by Forts Santiago and Concepcià ³n. In addition, the harbor was protected by the famed Fort San Juan de Ulà ºa which possessed 128 guns. Wishing to avoid the citys guns, Scott decided to land southeast of the city at Mocambo Bays Collado Beach. Moving into position, American forces prepared to go ashore on March 9. Covered by the guns of Connors ships, Worths men began moving towards the beach around 1:00 PM in specially designed surf boats. The only Mexican troops present were a small body of lancers which were driven off by naval gunfire. Racing ahead, Worth was the first American ashore and was quickly followed another 5,500 men. Facing no opposition, Scott landed the remainder of his army and began moving to invest the city. Investing Veracruz Sent north from the beachhead, Brigadier General Gideon Pillows brigade of Pattersons division defeated a force of Mexican cavalry at Malibrn. This severed the road to Alvarado and cut off the citys supply of fresh water. Pattersons other brigades, led by Brigadier Generals John Quitman and James Shields aided in holding off the enemy as Scotts men moved to surround Veracruz. The investment of the city was completed within three days and saw the Americans establish a line running from Playa Vergara south to Collado. Reducing the City Within the city, Brigadier General Juan Morales possessed 3,360 men as well as another 1,030 offshore at San Juan de Ulà ºa. Outnumbered, he hoped to hold the city until aid could arrive from the interior or the approaching yellow fever season began to reduce Scotts army. Though several of Scotts senior commanders wished to attempt a storming of the city, the methodical general insisted on reducing the city through siege tactics to avoid needless casualties. He insisted that the operation should cost the lives of no more than 100 men. Though a storm delayed the arrival of his siege guns, Scotts engineers including Captains Robert E. Lee and Joseph Johnston, as well as Lieutenant George McClellan began working to site gun emplacements and enhance the siege lines. On March 21, Commodore Matthew Perry arrived to relieve Connor. Perry offered six naval guns and their crews which Scott accepted. These were quickly emplaced by Lee. The next day, Scott demanded that Morales surrender the city. When this was refused, the American guns began bombarding the city. Though the defenders returned fire, they caused few injuries. No Relief The bombardment from Scotts lines was supported by Perrys ships offshore. On March 24, a Mexican soldier was captured carrying dispatches stating that General Antonio Là ³pez de Santa Anna was approaching the city with a relief force. Harneys dragoons were dispatched to investigate and located a force of around 2,000 Mexicans. To meet this threat, Scott dispatched Patterson with a force which drove off the enemy. The next day, the Mexicans in Veracruz requested a ceasefire and asked that women and children be allowed to leave the city. This was refused by Scott who believed it to be a delaying tactic. Resuming the bombardment, the artillery fire caused several fires in the city. On the night of March 25/26, Morales called a council of war. During the meeting, his officers recommended that he surrender the city. Morales was unwilling to do so and resigned leaving General Josà © Juan Landero to assume command. On March 26, the Mexicans again requested a ceasefire and Scott sent Worth to investigate. Returning with a note, Worth stated that he believed the Mexicans were stalling and offered to lead his division against the city. Scott declined and based on the language in the note, began surrender negotiations. After three days of talks, Morales agreed to surrender the city and San Juan de Ulà ºa. Aftermath Achieving his goal, Scott only lost 13 killed and 54 wounded in capturing the city. Mexican losses are less clear and were approximately 350-400 soldiers killed, as well as 100-600 civilians. Though initially chastised in the foreign press for the inhumanity of the bombardment, Scotts achievement in capturing a heavily fortified city with minimal losses was staggering. Establishing a large base at Veracruz, Scott quickly moved to get the bulk of his army away from the coast before yellow fever season. Leaving a small garrison to hold the city, the army departed on April 8 for Jalapa and began the campaign that would ultimately capture Mexico City.